

Monday, August 12, 1963

ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Witness: The Honorable Edwin O. Reischauer,  
United States Ambassador to Japan

Wednesday, July 24, 1963

United States Senate  
Subcommittee on National  
Security Staffing and  
Operations, Committee on  
Government Operations  
Washington, D. C.

(This hearing was held in executive session and subsequently ordered made public by the chairman of the committee.)

The subcommittee met at 9 a.m., pursuant to notice, in Room 3112, New Senate Office Building, Senator Henry M. Jackson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Jackson, Pell, and Miller.

Staff members present: Dorothy Fosdick, staff director; Robert W. Tufts, chief consultant; Robert C. Fisk, research assistant; Judith J. Spahr, chief clerk; and Laurel A. Engberg, minority consultant.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN

Senator Jackson. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today our subcommittee continues its hearings on the role of United States ambassadors and the missions they head in the conduct of our relations with other nations.

This subject forms part of the subcommittee's broad nonpartisan study into problems of national security administration.

We opened this phase of our hearings last month with testimony from two recently retired career ambassadors -- the Honorable Ellis O. Briggs and the Honorable H. Freeman Matthews. Today we hear from an outstanding non-career ambassador.

We are pleased to welcome the Honorable Edwin O. Reischauer, Ambassador of the United States to Japan. Ambassador Reischauer did his undergraduate work at Oberlin College and his graduate work at Harvard University. He has had a distinguished career as a student and teacher of Far Eastern affairs, and was called from his professorship at Harvard to his present post. Over the years the government has frequently drawn upon his knowledge and experience for advice on important matters.

He is the author of a number of books, including Japan, Past and Present (1946); War and Peace in Japan (1955); United States and Japan (1957).

Ambassador Reischauer is a gifted linguist and a distinguished scholar, qualities which have contributed greatly to his work in a country of very great importance.

Ambassador Reischauer, we are all happy to have you with us today.

I believe you have a prepared statement, and if there is no objection on the part of the subcommittee, we shall include it at this point in the record.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWIN O. REISCHAUER,  
AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN

I am very pleased to be here with the subcommittee today to discuss the administration of national security with particular reference to the role of the Embassy in Japan. Some idea of the amount of coordination required for the administration of national security problems in Japan may be gained by noting that there are twenty-one different departments and affiliated agencies of the United States Government represented in Tokyo in addition to the State Department. As a matter of convenience, I attach to this statement two organization charts, the first giving the division of work in the Embassy itself, and the second giving the Embassy's relationship to affiliated United States Government agencies.

The important things to note in looking at these charts are first, that USIS operates as an integral part of the Embassy, forming one of its five major sections, and second, that with a few exceptions, which I will refer to at greater length below, each one of the other affiliated agencies is administratively attached to an operative section of the Embassy itself. Thus, for example, the Federal Aviation Agency, the Foreign Agricultural Service, the United States Trade Center, the Maritime Administration, the United States Travel Service, the Office of International Finance of the Treasury Department, the Bureau of Customs of the Treasury Department, and the small remnant of AID left in Tokyo are assigned for administrative purposes to the Economic Section. Similarly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Immigration and Naturalization Service are assigned to the Consular Section, the General Accounting Office to the Administrative Section, and the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, with its laboratories in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to the Political Section.

Several offices are for administrative purposes assigned directly to my own, which includes the Office of the Deputy Chief of Mission. This is the situation with respect to the Scientific Attache, who coordinates closely with representatives in Tokyo of the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health. The same is true of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and the Attaches of the three military services. All these offices also coordinate very closely with the Political Section. With respect to MAAG and the Service Attaches, a special branch of the Political Section, the Politico-Military Branch, is constituted for the specific purpose of coordinating matters within the military sector. Thus, the Politico-Military Branch has responsibility for day-to-day coordination of all matters coming under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement with Japan, the Security Consultative Committee, Military Aid Program, and so on. Again, although the Scientific Attache and the Service Attaches are, as I say, attached to my office, the latter also attend the staff meetings of the Political and Economic Sections at least once a week, and a representative of the Scientific Attache attends Political Section staff meetings daily. For purposes of even closer coordination in the important scientific sector, the representative of the Atomic Energy Commission attends both the Political and Economic Section staff meetings.

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You will have gathered even from these preliminary remarks that a good deal of staffing is required for proper coordination of the manifold duties performed by the Embassy and its affiliated agencies, and in order to permit representation of the United States Government in Japan to be orchestrated so that they are in harmony with each other as well as with over-all United States policy toward Japan.

It might therefore be of interest to you if I proceeded to set forth in somewhat more detail the staff meeting schedule established in the Embassy for the purpose of that orchestration to which I have referred. All the operative sections of the Embassy as a general rule have morning staff meetings shortly after the opening of business each day. One of the functions of these meetings is to sift out important matters to be taken up at my own staff meeting, which is usually held daily at 10:30 a.m. This is attended by the chiefs of the Political, Economic, Consular, and Administrative Sections and by the Director of the United States Information Service in Japan, as well as by the Deputy Chief of Mission, my special assistant and staff aide, the Press Attache and such other officers as each regular participant might consider as contributing usefully to any subject which may be due for discussion on a particular day.

In addition, a Country Team meeting and a so-called "large staff meeting" are held alternately each Thursday in place of my usual staff meeting. The "large staff meeting" is attended by the representatives of all the sections in the Embassy and of all affiliated agencies in Tokyo. At this larger meeting, we discuss matters which are of wide common concern, such as, for example, cotton textile negotiations, or the basic elements of the problem created by the United States Government's desire to have nuclear-powered submarines visit Japanese ports.

At this point, I should like to speak in more detail about the Country Team and its place in the formulation and implementation of United States policy in Japan. In my view, the execution of United States national policy and the coordination of policy recommendation and guidance have been greatly facilitated through the agency of the Country Team. Thus, the Country Team has provided an excellent mechanism for continuous discussion and coordination of action relating to such significant problems, for example, as the implementation of provisions of the Security Treaty with respect to U.S. military forces in Japan, the military assistance program, and the over-all review of situations in nearby troubled areas as they apply to U.S. objectives in Japan. As these and other problems have become more and more complex, and have required greater joint efforts by U.S. Government officials and agencies in Japan, the system of fortnightly meetings of the Country Team referred to earlier has evolved. By providing a forum more suitable for complex discussion than earlier informal luncheon meetings, which were the means used to bring together what is now the Country Team prior to 1956, these fortnightly meetings have increased the value and usefulness of the coordination process.

A significant increase in the value of the Country Team concept has also resulted from the participation of a wide range of U.S. officials in team meetings. While the formal members of the Country Team include only myself, the Commander, USFJ, and the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, regular participants in team meetings in Tokyo, and in the day-to-day work of the Team, include in addition the Deputy Chief of Mission; the Minister for Economic Affairs; the Minister for Cultural and Public Affairs (USIS); the Political Counselor; the Army, Navy and Air Attaches; the Chief of the Internal Affairs Branch of the Political Section; and the Chief of the Political-Military Branch of the Political Section.

It will be noted that in addition to Chief, MAAG, the Commander, USFJ, is a key member of the Country Team. This is essential for the proper consideration of the many vital policy problems which arise in Japan as a result of our Security Treaty and the presence of some 45,000 U.S. military personnel (plus an additional 55,000 dependents) in the country. It will also be noted that unlike the situation in many other countries, AID is not a constituent member of the Team. This is because the economic assistance program in Japan has been eliminated and only a residual AID office remains in Tokyo to supervise offshore procurement and third country training in Japan.

Coordinating Country Team operations, staffing for position papers, recording and distributing the minutes and preparing agenda for Country Team meetings are responsibilities of the Embassy's Political-Military Branch. Happily, in spite of the relatively great distances physically separating the basic elements of the Country Team -- USFJ, for example, is over an hour's drive from the Embassy -- coordination has been accomplished without serious difficulty.

It may not be inappropriate at this point to note that successful coordination is at least partly a result of the excellent personal relations existing among Country Team participants. These relations allow the group truly to function as a team and not merely as an assembly of representatives of different government agencies.

The fortnightly meetings are held in the Embassy Conference Room. Complete flexibility in scheduling meetings is maintained, however, and ad hoc meetings are held as necessary. Similarly, regular meetings are cancelled if none of the members has sufficiently important business to justify holding them.

Basic procedure for preparing the agenda for these meetings is well established. At the beginning of the week in which a meeting is scheduled, the Chief of the Embassy's Political-Military Branch communicates with (1) the Secretary, Joint Staff, Headquarters, Commander USFJ and (2) the Office of Chief, MAAG, Japan, in order to ascertain what items those components of the Team wish to propose for inclusion in the agenda. This information, along with any agenda items the various sections of the Embassy may wish discussed at the meeting, is then passed to the Counselor for Political Affairs, who outlines the proposed agenda to me at my daily staff meeting. On the basis of the proposed agenda, and after such consultation with other U.S. officials as may be required, I decide whether or not to hold the regular meeting.

While the activities of the Country Team are most clearly focused in fortnightly meetings, they are not limited to them, for by necessity, much work requiring sustained attention and effort must be dealt with on a continuous basis outside the structure of actual meetings. Indeed, matters which may require Country Team approval are most often staffed through the Country Team mechanism without there being any need to convoke a formal meeting. Further, it would be rare for any item on the agenda of a given meeting not to have been fully staffed at the working level before becoming a subject of Country Team discussion. To a great extent, therefore, the Country Team's work involves reviewing recommendations worked out at the staff level and arriving at an agreed position or course of action.

Thus, by means of a system of fortnightly meetings and extensive staff work outside these meetings, the work of the Country Team in Japan is coordinated, and discussion and implementation of U.S. policy on a broad front are facilitated. It is my belief that the system which has been evolved is well suited to assist in the formulation and execution of U.S. policy in Japan.

I would imagine that this brief statement of the organization of the Embassy and of its role in the administration of national security has raised some questions in your minds. My hope is that what I have said will serve as a basis for a more detailed discussion of this subject and I welcome any questions you might have.

(The two organizational charts referred to in Ambassador Reischauer's statement -- The American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan, July 1, 1963 and The American Embassy and Affiliated Agencies, Tokyo, Japan, July 1, 1963 -- appear at the conclusion of the hearing.)

Senator Jackson. We are very happy to have your statement, Ambassador Reischauer. We will proceed now to ask questions.

Do you have any additional comments that you wish to make prior to our questions?

Ambassador Reischauer. I might just add a few remarks.

First of all, I am testifying from a very different point of view from your previous witnesses. Not having had a career in the Foreign Service, all I can possibly add is a freshness of point of view of an outsider who has been in it only a little over two years.

Some of the problems that have come up have been problems of whether or not the overall diplomatic establishment was too large for adequate policy coordination, whether or not the flood of messages back and forth between the embassies and Washington was so great that policy was somewhat lost sight of in this great flow of words.

My own feeling, after two and a quarter years' experience in Japan, is that neither of these worries is really well founded.

We have in Japan a fairly large diplomatic establishment.

I have seen no problem of policy coordination, no problem of organization. These certainly are not too large to handle, by any means. It does take a certain amount of organization, perhaps, to see that different diverse branches do not get in each other's way, but I have not seen any serious problem of that sort at all in Japan.

And while we do have a tremendous exchange of materials between ourselves and Washington, it has always seemed to me valuable. You need this exchange at all sorts of different levels, and I think there is a pragmatically efficient way, a very sensitive way, of sorting out the important things for the right sort of attention.

There are perhaps ways in which this can be further perfected, but the whole mechanism seems to me to work very well.

Senator Jackson. You do not find any problems of excessive reporting?

Ambassador Reischauer. Back here, perhaps, some people might feel that way.

Senator Jackson. I mean from your end.

Ambassador Reischauer. No, not from our end. Not from our end at all.

There is this flood of paper, and one wonders whether it is all necessary, but I think one finds that there are ways in which one can keep on top of it, and then it all proves valuable.

In fact, we are always asking for more information on certain things; and Washington is, too, the other way around. If there is any danger, it is sometimes that we do not get the details back and forth to each other fast enough.

Senator Jackson. What methods have you used to better utilize the information that flows in? You have a good, competent staff, I take it. And are you able to delegate your work sufficiently?

Ambassador Reischauer. Yes, I think so. I mean that is the whole point in having an organization of this sort, to be sure that the important thing comes to the top, and that the people at the top do not get flooded by it.

I should say there is one problem in messages going back and forth: at what level do you need clearance? This is a problem you always have to keep watching, because every now and then people down the line will send out a message expressing the view of the embassy, and I think if we express a view on something rather than just reporting, you need fairly high clearance. There are problems of this sort.

Going the other way, I think there is sometimes difficulty in knowing who is actually speaking to you in a message. They are all signed "Rusk", let us say, but sometimes you know it did not come within several ranks of the Secretary.

Senator Jackson. There needs to be a code within a code.

Ambassador Reischauer. And you can tell by the code this was only cleared at a relatively low level, and therefore you should understand it in that way, and that this is not necessarily the personal opinion of an Under Secretary or the Secretary.

I think that maybe some codes within a code would be useful, as you say.

Senator Miller. Could I ask a question?

How much of the time of your staff would you say is dedicated to reporting?

Ambassador Reischauer. It probably would vary with the different types of people.

You mean reporting in the sense of just getting information back that might be useful in Washington?

Senator Miller. Preparation of a report to be sent back to Washington.

Ambassador Reischauer. Telegrams and reports, and so on?

Senator Miller. Yes; to meet the requirements of reporting on the State Department end.

Ambassador Reischauer. It would be very hard to say. Between a quarter and a half of the time, perhaps.

But, you see, much of this reporting is really their own research work in keeping up with the field that they are following.

You take the man that is our contact man with the Government Party. He is constantly trying to learn as much as he can about the leaders of this Government Party, what they are thinking. He is talking with them all the time. And every once in a while, when he thinks he has enough information to be of value to Washington, he writes it up as a report.

But he has done this basically for his own knowledge.

Senator Miller. Yes. Well, I would want to distinguish between what one does for his own knowledge and his own competence in carrying on his assigned duties there and the work that goes into getting that information back to Washington.

Ambassador Reischauer. Well, there is a third category. There are, you know, these routine requests for reporting on certain types of things, that you do fairly routinely. I should say in the economic field there is more of that than there would be in the political field.

I think the very fact of drafting it up into a message is itself a valuable exercise for the reporting officer, because sometimes a person can have a rather vague impression of the whole thing, but until he is forced to put it in good format, he has not thought it through himself.

Senator Miller. You do not think a certain amount of that crystallization of his thinking could have already been gone through in the course of the staff meetings that are held? I would imagine that at one of his staff meetings or your own staff meetings, for this thing to be articulated properly, it would require some thinking through.

I would hope by the time it got around to a staff meeting with you he would have thought it through pretty well, and that anything beyond that for the purposes of Washington would not be required.

I am trying to come up with your idea on how this can be improved, because those of us who have served in the military at both the headquarters level and at the field level know that this thing can get out of hand.

And there have been time checks and all kinds of efficiency systems evolved to try to cope with this problem. But I must say that I was shocked when I first came across the information regarding the flood of paper that descends on Washington.

That means somebody out in the field has to do something. And I can see where you can even get bogged down. Sometimes these things can be eliminated, and sometimes they can be streamlined and sometimes there can be summaries, rather than full reports.

There are a lot of those things that we have found in the military that can be eliminated. Somebody back here has to shuffle them around. And when you eliminate just one, there can be a chain reaction which can cut down a lot of time and overhead.

I just wonder if you have had occasion to review some of the reporting required of you and your staff. Have you tried to eliminate some of it, or streamline it?

Ambassador Reischauer. I am not aware of any large bulk of material that is not of value to ourselves in the drafting process. Of course, the staff meeting tends to be a fairly informal thing, with us. I try to get people to express their views and discuss them back and forth, rather than having canned reports, and so it serves a somewhat different function. It is an exchange of views, primarily.

I find, myself, the more routine reports of my staff are very useful to me. I keep them on my desk, and when I have a little time, I catch up on them and read them, because there are lots of things I cannot follow in as much detail as they are following.

They are often eager to write these, actually, because it is their way of presenting the thing that they have discovered to the rest of us there, as well as back in Washington.

In almost every case where there has been a real attempt to cut down on this flow, there is somebody back in Washington that screams in agony when it does not come in any more.

Now, mighty often these are people down at the research level, who are doing the day-to-day work. I think it is very valuable to have a research back-up in Washington as well as with us, where the papers are pretty well in detail.

Senator Miller. In reporting to you, do you have them summarize their topics?

Ambassador Reischauer. Almost all of our longer reports come in with a summary statement at the beginning, and you can glance at that and decide whether you want to read the rest of the report.

With my time as tight as it is, I must admit I often let the thing go by with just the reading of the summary.

Senator Miller. Would it be feasible, in lieu of some of these reports that go back to Washington, to merely indicate a summary, let's say, of a few points of what is contained in some of these studies, so that the people back here could then determine whether to ask you to send the whole report on or forget about it?

Ambassador Reischauer. Actually, as long as you have a pouch going back and forth all the time, it in itself is not a real problem. It is a problem of who is going to read it when it gets to this side.

And I suspect what happens here is what happens with us. The busier people will glance at summaries and put it aside, whereas the people who have the back-up research function are the ones who are going to read it and appreciate it.

So I doubt very much if this does cut into your time very seriously, on this side, any more than it does with me there.

That is what I mean. It is a pragmatically worked out system, but I do not think we waste much time reading things that are not necessary to be read.



Senator Miller. That certainly is one of our problems here, to figure out what to read. And I know that commanders have a time problem.

And granted that staff people love to write reports, because this is a good way of impressing the commander with your knowledge on something, I would hope they would save their time by writing summaries.

If you want to dig in, you can get them to give you the details. A nutshell approach saves time.

Ambassador Reischauer. We always have a summary on the front of a report there. In fact, in some cases the title is enough for you. You know you will not want to read the rest of it.

Senator Jackson. Mr. Engberg?

Professor Engberg. I was much interested in your formal statement, about how you prepare for these staff meetings. I recalled after reading that, an article Ambassador Matthews had put in the Foreign Service Journal about coordination, and I was wondering what you might give us as to your procedure.

Ambassador Matthews pointed out that there is serious danger in consulting with the top agencies, that you may not have coordination throughout the lower areas. And he suggested that the ambassador's task was finding out what was happening on all the lower levels, and coordinating. This gets into the area that we talked about once before -- the danger of each agency giving its own view only.

What is your thinking as to the lower level type of coordination, so that you get the true picture when you have your top staff meeting?

Ambassador Reischauer. Yes. Of course, through the meetings of the sections, which bring together all these agencies that might have a somewhat related interest, we do have coordination at that level, and some of these agencies go to more than one of the staff meetings, as you can see in this paper.

So the problem is: How can I keep in touch with all of this, and it is a problem I felt very much.

When I first went there, I found that there was such a tendency for all authority to stem from the top down that if the ambassador spoke, then no one else would speak. And this went away on down the line.

If I got the political counselor's views, I did not find out the view of the man who had argued with him at a lower level.

I have done my best to make everything go the other way around. In my own staff meetings, I never speak first. I always start with them, to bring up all the problems they want, and get them all talking, and I keep the Deputy Chief of Mission and myself to the very end, to pick up the points that have not been brought up.

This is just exactly a reversal of the procedure that I had found there. And I insisted I wanted to get the divergent views and not just the view of the economic or political section as decided at the very top. I wanted to have something of the argumentation that had gone on below on the very same thing.

This does not assure me that it always does come through, and I still have a feeling that I wish I had closer contact with the people down the line. But I think this is a problem, and would be a problem, in any large organization.

Senator Jackson. I wanted to turn, if I might, to the matter of long-range planning in the embassies.

We have found that for one reason or another, generally speaking, the embassies have not been able to do this. Do you have the staff for this purpose?

First of all, do you see a need for a planning staff or planning group within the embassy?

Ambassador Reischauer. I am not sure that I see a use for a separate planning staff there. I feel very strongly that the ambassador and the top officers should themselves be thinking in long-range terms.

I just do not see how you could do a job of this sort if you do not have a sort of philosophy of history, of where this all fits in. You have to think in those terms, or you do not make any sense out of what you are doing from day to day.

I do not see how you can give this to another group who are going to be your philosophers, while you are the do-ers.

Senator Jackson. You feel the operators should be the planners?

Ambassador Reischauer. I feel that way, and that is the reason I am very happy when I find some of our best officers writing long-term think-pieces. What is happening in Japanese politics? We have had some very good papers of that sort.

Some of these may seem awfully far away from immediate administration. But I believe thinking of this sort is important. I did a paper last summer myself, trying to think through the whole thing, what we were really dealing with in roughly a ten-year period.

And one of our chief political officers did an extremely good analytical piece on the nature of the development of the Japanese parties, as to what was happening there long-term, and so what we were going to have to deal with in the future.

The men who have the chief responsibility and the chief contact are the ones that are best able to do this, and I think we just have to reserve our own time to do this thing, as well as do the day-to-day work.

Senator Jackson. Do you have the back-up staff you need to help you in formulating long-term policies as you see them develop in your day-to-day operating experience?

In other words, you are at the top of the embassy with your key people, and you sit around, and you are confronted daily with the host of problems that you have to meet.

Do you find the time to really sit down as a planning staff, as a planning group, with your key people?

Ambassador Reischauer. To get it on paper, you have to find some special time.

I did a big piece last summer, when I took myself a little vacation. I went away for about ten days, and I sat down and did this. It was the only way you could do a job of that kind -- come up with a long paper.

But actually I think we use our staff meeting very much for that purpose, because quite often we get away from the immediate issue to talk about the long-range implications of it and where we are going, and so I think there is a sort of oral tradition of this sort.

Here we are talking about this big problem, and where we stand in it, and our staff meeting does not therefore just stick to, "Well, here is a document, and how do we answer it?" I am very happy to get away from that and talk about the bigger issues.

Senator Miller. What happens to that report when it comes back here? How long are the think-pieces?

Ambassador Reischauer. We get very interesting reactions here.

Senator Miller. Where does it go? Does it go to a long-range planning staff?

Ambassador Reischauer. I presume the long-range planning staff looks at that.

I am very much interested to see that all up and down the line the officers over here will have read it, if it is something of real interest. It goes around to CINCPAC. People like that come back and say, "That was interesting. We think this is fine." And so on.

Senator Jackson. I think we ought to point out that Ambassador Reischauer is rather unique. He is a scholar on all matters relating to the Far East, and Japan in particular.

Ambassador Reischauer. I come with a long-range interest in this particular area and problem, and therefore look at it in those terms.

Senator Miller. But is there a long-range planning officer over here at State that would take something from someone in the Philippines and Southwest Asia?

Ambassador Reischauer. Yes. The State Department's policy planning staff does that. There is a tendency for the policy planning staff to perhaps work more on crisis problems rather than non-crisis areas such as Japan.

Senator Miller. How about long-range? Do they not have long-range planning?

Ambassador Reischauer. As I think back over the State Department's history, they are always setting up groups that are going to think in terms of the long-range, and they are always being brought closer and closer to the immediate present.

This has happened with various staffs I have watched over there. There is this danger.

Senator Miller. But the State Department's policy planning staff is the one that has this function?

Senator Jackson. They have the responsibility. The staff is headed by Walt W. Rostow.

Ambassador Reischauer. Right.

Senator Jackson. Now, when you are able to get in a good paper on what you see the situation to be at present, and the direction it is going, and so on, do you find that a document of that importance gets to the Secretary of State and to the President?

Ambassador Reischauer: I am not aware that either of them has read these particular ones I had in my mind. I dare say if they did not see it, much of the thinking of it was transmitted to them in terms of conversation with other people at the top, who have read it. It certainly gets up to the Assistant Secretary level -- things of that sort.

Senator Jackson. Well, it seems to me when we have a good ambassador and a good embassy staff, they can be a very vital part of our policy planning. When an ambassador is in a country as important as Japan, he has an opportunity right on the scene to translate his day-to-day experience into what the direction should be for the future.

And the operator can be the best planner. I think this is something we need to really capitalize on.

Do we have a pre-approved policy plan towards Japan that you follow?

Ambassador Reischauer. Yes, we have a paper. I forget whether it is revised every two years, or something of that sort. I remember when I first came in, a little over two years ago, they were in the process of just finishing one up, and they gave me a chance to read it and make some suggestions on it.

We are just going through another process of that sort now, I think primarily from the policy planning group back here in Washington. It has been over several months' time that they have been putting together something of this sort.

Senator Jackson. Well, is this paper worked out in conjunction with you and your people?

Ambassador Reischauer. It goes back and forth between the desk officer in State and us, and they rewrite it and so on.

Senator Jackson. What is the genesis of it? Do you start it?

Ambassador Reischauer. This past one as I remember was written up at the desk level here, originally.

I happened to be back here in November-December for a couple of weeks, and in between all the other things I was doing then, I read it and made quite extensive changes in it at white-hot speed at that moment. They did some further work, and than it came to us in Japan, and has been very much rewritten in our different sections. Then it has gone back here, and they are doing some further rewrite on what we did.

Senator Jackson. Do you have a substantial influence in the final version in the embassy staff?

Ambassador Reischauer. Oh, yes.

Senator Jackson. And then when that process was completed, did the Secretary of State approve it, and did the President approve it?

Ambassador Reischauer. I am not sure at what level it gets final approval.

Senator Jackson. But it is national policy?

Ambassador Reischauer. Yes. And what it turns out to be, then, is pretty well descriptive of what people think the situation is, and the thinking is at that moment.

It really does not plan too far into the future. But it is awfully useful for anybody coming in new to the situation to see a statement of what the thinking was as of that time.

Senator Jackson. Do you find it adequate?

Ambassador Reischauer. I think it is fairly adequate, yes.

Actually, once you have done it, the people who have taken part in it find their minds going on, and they go beyond it fairly soon. So I do not find myself going back to, "What does it tell us to do," because we have helped draft it up, and we should go beyond it as events unfold.

But I think it is very useful for the person who is only peripherally involved in the Japan picture, and therefore needs this for reference, or the man coming newly into the Japan scene.

Senator Miller. How far in the future does it go?

Ambassador Reischauer. It does talk about the general future. I do not mean it does not go into the future, but as we move into the future ourselves, we begin revising it.

Senator Miller. There are not two papers, one devoted to short-range and the other to long-range?

Ambassador Reischauer. No. And it is based on a fundamental assumption of what may happen over a ten year period, just on the kinds of things we have been thinking through in these specific papers.

Professor Tufts. When Miss Fosdick and I were in Japan last fall, we were told, if I remember correctly, that there was a planning paper for USIS, which neither the present USIS group nor its predecessor had had an adequate opportunity to participate in drafting. There was some feeling that more consultation with the embassy, the USIS group in Tokyo, would have been helpful.

I take it this is not the situation in your relations with State.

Ambassador Reischauer. Well, they are now just in the process of revising the USIS paper, "Country Plan," I think they call it. Our USIS man sent back one which he has written largely himself, I think, so they may feel a little differently right now. This was some months ago that you were there. Perhaps they had reference to the fact that certain elements in it, some overall statements of objectives and so on, were dictated from Washington as of some time ago, and people in the field would perhaps prefer to phrase it differently.

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I remember the United States force in Japan at one time commented, "Can't you say this better?" and that turned out to be the part that was from Washington, that we could not change. So maybe they were having reference to the fact that some of it was already set.

Professor Engberg. I was wondering if the Ambassador had any information on whether the Department of State gives the same consideration to other ambassadors.

Ambassador Reischauer is an expert in his field, and I can well see where they might seriously consider his recommendation on all these long-term programs.

Do you know at all from your acquaintanceship with other ambassadors and your various contacts whether or not the other embassies are given the same consideration on planning papers that your office is given?

Ambassador Reischauer. I had the impression they were, but not having had that extensive experience in the Foreign Service, I could not say.

Senator Jackson. Returning to the issues of reporting and planning, when you have an important point to make, an important suggestion that you feel is very vital in our relations with Japan and therefore with the Far East, do you have any trouble getting that information to the highest levels that are necessary in order to take effective action?

Ambassador Reischauer. No. That is what I mean by a fairly pragmatically worked out system. Theoretically, the telegrams are all the same. Sometimes limited distribution will get it higher. But you use that usually for security reasons.

But you use the first person. If you say, "I did this," you see, this almost automatically brings it up to higher attention. So there are ways of drafting it.

I do not know if there is any rule book that describes this, but I have found in practice there are ways of getting higher attention, by the phrasing.

Senator Jackson. Then, I expect, there are certain situations in which you feel the issues involved are such that it would be better to come to Washington?

Ambassador Reischauer. I have never had to do that.

Senator Jackson. You have never had to do it. You have been able to handle matters through written communications for the most part?

Ambassador Reischauer. Well, there are many cases where you probably feel as though you could have done a better job if you came back here and talked directly with people.

Actually, this week I find myself having turned up quite by accident at a very opportune moment on a very important problem that I probably could not have handled as well in Tokyo as by being here.

Senator Jackson. Under Secretary of State Harriman indicated, in his testimony to this committee, that if our ambassadors could come in more often, this at least would help the reporting problem, and it would be more useful both to the Department of State and to the ambassadors themselves.

Ambassador Reischauer. I have come back on an average of between six months and a year. I have found it very useful to come back. I am not sure it would be more useful to come back more often than that, because I think these messages on the whole are very adequate.

I am always very much impressed by how much aware they are of, you know, that message you sent, if you sent it in the right form. And I think it is just about as good as if you were on the spot.

Senator Miller. What about the key members of the staff coming back? Do they do that?

Ambassador Reischauer. Very little.

Senator Miller. What about the comments from the headquarters here, or the State Department's policy planning staff going out there?

Ambassador Reischauer. We do not see too much of the policy planning staff, that I am aware of. I think I would like to see them more often.

Senator Miller. Do you think it would be helpful to have the policy planning staff come out to the field once in a while?

Ambassador Reischauer. Yes. For instance, I have not been able to persuade Mr. Rostow to come out. He promised me one time, and was not able to do it because other crisis areas absorbed his time.

Senator Miller. But how about one or two of his right-hand men coming out?

Ambassador Reischauer. I think it would be very good.

I do not remember cases of top people in policy planning coming out. It may be just a slip in my memory. We do see a great number of other people. I am very happy to see them. I think it is very useful.

We have a constant flow of Government officials through Tokyo, State Department people and others who are involved in foreign policy.

Senator Miller. Probably too many.

Ambassador Reischauer. One could think that way, but I do not think it can be too many.

Senator Jackson. Depending on the quality.

Senator Miller. But you would like to see somebody from the policy planning office?

Ambassador Reischauer. Yes, that would be useful, I am sure.

Senator Jackson. To return for a moment to the policy guidance that you get, do you find that it is clear and unequivocal, so that you can pretty well carry out your duties and responsibilities as ambassador? Or is there a lot of improvising and are there ad hoc arrangements that do not always leave you with clear-cut guidance as to the course you should pursue?

Ambassador Reischauer. It is usually clear-cut, I think. Sometimes it is slow in arriving, because so many of our important problems in Japan are inter-departmental problems -- economic ones involving Commerce, Agriculture, Fisheries, things like that, and then the military.

Senator Jackson. On the fundamental questions? I realize an issue will come up in a specific area that does not actually change your broad general directive. Do you find that you are pretty clear in your own mind as to the course you should pursue, based on the written policy statement?

Ambassador Reischauer. Yes, I think so. But that may be simply because I have a clear idea in my own mind. I think our general statement is quite clear, our overall policies, and so on.

Senator Jackson. This is one of the things that has concerned us. For a while I think the government tended to be too precise and formal on these things, and now there may be a tendency to go the other way, to improvise and to be a little too flexible.

Ambassador Reischauer. Well, perhaps we have a somewhat different situation in Japan from what you have in many countries of the world. We do not have a rapidly changing situation there. You have to have an overall interpretation of where things are likely to go over a certain period of time, and I do not think in Washington or Tokyo there has been any fundamental revision of that general attitude.

This does allow, then, an ambassador within that general framework to have his own fairly clear-cut ideas of just how it should be played.

We do not have a change from year to year because of some revolution or change of leadership in the country. So I do not think this would be a typical case, at all.

I think you would have much more serious problems, let's say, in the countries of Southeast Asia, where you might have to have a fairly rapid change because of a great upheaval.

Senator Miller. Could I pursue that one idea you have had?

You have indicated you would like to see more of the policy planning staff people come out in the field. What about their counterparts in some of the other agencies? For example, from Commerce, coming out. Do they do that?

Ambassador Reischauer. Yes, we get people like that all the time.

Senator Miller. So the liaison on a visitation basis is pretty good except when it comes to the policy planning office in the State Department?

Ambassador Reischauer. Yes. Specifically, I do not remember those people coming out very much. We do have a large number of people from Defense, Commerce, all of the departments that would be involved in things of this sort.



Senator Jackson. Turning to the Defense area, which must tie in so closely with our foreign policy objectives and operations, what is your relationship with the military, and how do you in general get along? Do you have any comments on that?

Ambassador Reischauer. This is the most important coordination problem we have in Japan, without a shadow of a doubt. We have 45,000 men in uniform there, which gives you a population of over a hundred thousand on the military side in Japan.

And the most difficult and crucial aspect of our relations with Japan is with defense, because this is the controversial issue of Japanese politics, making this our most difficult problem. And so liaison between the embassy and the United States forces in Japan is absolutely essential.

Actually, we have an extremely close relationship. We have a country team which formalizes this relationship, but the essence of it is the fact that the commander of the United States forces in Japan -- up through this month it is Jake Smart, an extremely fine man -- he and I are in very close contact.

It is like the traditional school, one person at each end of a log. We are two people at each end of a sofa, and we get together all of the time and talk over each of our problems, and when we have staff work, we have a country team meeting that comes every two weeks.

But we never dream of doing anything that involves the other without consultation. He gives me his speeches, if he is going to make a speech, or anything like that. He comes and tells me his problems, and I discuss mine with him.

Senator Jackson. And this runs pretty well down through all the levels?

Ambassador Reischauer. Down through the levels, the same kind of very close relationship exists. We draft an important message to go to Washington, sent ostensibly from the embassy. Just the day I left there was a very important message coming out. It did not say "country team," or anything like that. There were two colonels and a Navy captain backstopping me on this, coming over from the headquarters of the United States forces in Japan, because it deeply involved them. This is the kind of relationship we have.

Senator Jackson. I am certainly glad to hear that, because we have had some experiences where Defense and State get rather out of touch -- take for example the Skybolt problem. And certainly in Japan, you have a whole series of sensitive areas, in which the military are involved on a day-to-day basis, and that have of necessity to be closely coordinated with the job you are doing.

Ambassador Reischauer. Yes. We have a third element in that, and that is our MAAG, of course, the Military Aid Assistance Group, which is, according to the charts, part of the embassy. But it has to have very close relationships with the United States forces in Japan.

And so there is a three-way coordination. But the kind of thing they are in on tends to be more of a technical nature, weapons and that sort of thing. There is very, very close staff coordination, but it is not as crucial as the coordination between General Smart and myself on things that have an overall relationship with Japan.

Senator Jackson. You find it is the quality of the people as much as anything that makes the difference?

Ambassador Reischauer. This is the basic thing, of course. You cannot have a fine organization if you do not have the right people, and if you have the right people, you do not really need such a detailed organization.

Senator Miller. I hate to have to leave. It has been nice to get acquainted with you.

(At this point Senator Miller withdrew from the hearing room.)

Ambassador Reischauer. We have the danger of general Smart and myself getting together without sufficient staff behind us, so we had to go back to a more formal type of meeting so that it could be properly recorded.

Professor Tufts. In terms of developing our relations with Japan, what are the most important tools with which you have to work? I suppose they are economic to some extent, and military to some extent, and informational to some extent. Do you feel, as you have watched this over the past couple of years, that we are making effective use of these tools?

What I am leading to is: What if anything do you see as the problems in making better use of these instruments for influencing relations?

Ambassador Reischauer. I think the policy is just as with any complicated problem, to subordinate the minor to the major.

We have loads of, let's say, minor economic problems, that help to roil things up, and therefore make major political relationships more difficult. You have got to keep them in perspective. It is awfully hard to do, because each one of these belongs to somebody's particular area of administrative control overhere, or political concern, and so on.

Just the coordination of these things is a very difficult thing, if you are thinking in terms of specific instrumentalities for improving the relationship.

And of course, economic problems are very much involved. For instance, cotton textiles is a very good case in point. This can cause a great deal of ill will -- this of course goes both ways -- over what turns out to be a very small item in the huge overall trade.

On the military side, the relationship of our military to the Japanese public is a vitally important thing. Very fortunately, our military is very much aware of that. If we had military men who were not aware of this public relations problem, we could have endless trouble. But we are very fortunate in having from the top on down in our military in Japan people who seem to be extremely well aware of this, and work awfully hard at it.

Perhaps the most important instrumentality is the information side, or cultural exchange, or whatever you want to call it, or intellectual contact.

People do not like to use the word "intellectual," but this is perhaps the most important aspect of it there, the USIS and all the aspects of its activity.

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But you have the United States military in the same effort to have an overall influence. And I should say our whole embassy is really doing a sort of USIS job. There are ways in which we could make it more effective, but as long as we all realize this is important --

Senator Jackson. The military insofar as their base commanders are concerned -- are they fully indoctrinated before they come, and then after they get over there, on rather a continuous basis, to know what the problem is in their community, what approach they should take towards the local citizens, and so on, this being one of the troublesome problems that you have to face?

Ambassador Reischauer. I dare say there is good indoctrination before they come. I am not sure on that point. I think perhaps the main thing is the leadership of the commanding general. He understands it and helps indoctrinate people on down the line.

Of course, the chief men in every service are very important, and we are very fortunate in that. And people down the line begin to take the lead from those above them.

Professor Tufts. I remember that you attached a great deal of importance to the point of communications in your book, in 1955, Wanted: An Asian Policy. And in that book you made a strong case for the importance of having people not only speak the language but understand the culture enough to be able to express what they have to say in a way which would make it understandable to the people they are talking to.

To what extent do you think your staff meets these requirements now, in the USIS staff and other staffs that are involved in this?

Ambassador Reischauer. Well, you probably never achieve perfection in this. But we have made a lot of advances. The embassy has a fairly high degree of linguistic skills. We have built that side up quite considerably.

You cannot go too far. You want a balance of people who are not deeply in the Japanese scene, too, in key places, also. I think you have to have that balance.

So the embassy itself I think is fairly well balanced that way. Perhaps USIS could use a great deal more linguistic skills. They just are not available as yet. We have a pretty good training program for the young men, in rather large numbers.

Professor Tufts. That was the next point I wanted to raise. This committee has been quite interested in training problems.

You say you have a training program. Do you think it is a good one? Or could it be improved in some ways?

I wanted to ask what sort of a training program would in your judgment best prepare the young officers for their work?

Ambassador Reischauer. There has been a lot of experience behind this. The one problem is the problem of weeding people out of this kind of work who do not have the real talents for it. And we keep setting up a system.

Recently we started a system whereby a person would have a trial period there, and a trial period in the field, to see if he is really suited for work in Japan and has linguistic skills worth developing.

After he has proved both of them, you give him a full course. The only danger is the one of human frailty, where everybody wants to be so kind to everybody else that it is awfully hard to bust a person out of the system. There may be sort of a black spot on his record. But it is not a kindness to him to keep him in if he does not have the talents for it.

Professor Tufts. In this same book of yours, you said that: "The specialist who learns the native language and becomes an expert in the native culture and psychology is likely to find his accomplishments hindrances rather than aids to his promotion."

"Our foreign service," you said there, "is geared to produce fine mixers with other Americans rather than to produce the all-important contact men with Asians."

Ambassador Reischauer. When I wrote that, I think it was descriptive of the system. I trust this is being changed. But there is always this prejudice. It is a problem.

Professor Tufts. What does this suggest to you about tours of duty and about the need for opportunities for people who do want to specialize in a particular language and culture and so on? Do you think we need people in the Foreign Service who will spend a large part of their lives working on Japanese matters?

Ambassador Reischauer. There are certain areas where I think it is necessary, absolutely necessary. Japan is probably an outstanding example. Korea is a place where if we had more of that, we probably would be in a much sounder position than we are today.

The China area -- of course, we do not have much of a China area to deal with -- has always been in the same position exactly. That is, these are countries that have very different languages from ours, and really utilize them as a medium of communication.

India, after all, uses English. Africa still is using western languages. And you do not have quite the same problem that you do in the Far East.

There used to be a special Japan and China Service, back before the war. It was necessary in those days. I think it will be necessary for a long time in the future. That means people who are expected to spend a much higher percentage of their career in one area than is true of the Service as a whole.

Professor Tufts. Do you have such men on your staff there?

Ambassador Reischauer. Oh, yes, we have lots of them. And we are training men all the time. I get the impression that half of their foreign service would be spent in contact with the country of their special interest.

Professor Tufts. And do you find that they are getting promotions adequately?

Ambassador Reischauer. I think so, yes. The really able ones are, yes. I think there has been a change in that regard.

Senator Jackson. Senator Pell?

Senator Pell. Thank you. Excuse me for being late. I had another meeting.

In connection with your table of organization, I notice that you have the military attaches reporting directly to you, not to MAAG and then to you. Some thought is being given to the idea that the MAAG commander's office should be combined with the position of Defense attache? What is your view on that?

Ambassador Reischauer. MAAG is a very specialized job with us, a highly technical job, and their problem of relationship there is between them and the United States Forces, Japan.

We have a large military there. They have a very close working relationship. In the chart they come under us, but the three of us work very closely together.

Among the various service attaches in a country like Japan, where you have the large military establishment already there, you have a somewhat anomalous position. They tend to be just liaison officers, to help liaison between these various elements.

Senator Pell. Who serves as the liaison?

Ambassador Reischauer. The service attaches.

Actually, I think someone should look into the whole problem of what the function of a service attache is in an embassy in a country where there is a large American military establishment that quite overshadows the service attaches.

I think the military itself are beginning to think about this problem, because obviously United States Forces, Japan, has taken over a large part of the function that would normally be in the hands of a service attache.

Senator Pell. This is a question I had hoped to lead into, because I had been of the view that the commanding officer at MAAG should also be the Defense Department attache as well, and when this would happen, there would be happier relationships with both the embassy staff and perhaps some of the other people.

Ambassador Reischauer. It is a perfectly conceivable concept, except that we have somebody even more important, and that is the commander of the United States Forces in Japan, who is really the Defense Department representative there.

And for anything of a military nature, and as I was pointing out earlier, the most difficult problems we have are of a military nature, since this is a crucial area, in Japan -- on things of this sort my relationship with the commander of United States Forces in Japan is the important thing.

Senator Pell. Which is the senior Defense attache?

Ambassador Reischauer. We do not have one. The Naval attache is responsible for the maintenance of all the facilities for the rest of them; but he is not over them.

Senator Pell. When you get into the other islands around Japan, the Ryukyus and others, do they come under you?

Ambassador Reischauer. The Ryukyu Islands are a great problem for us, but they do not come under us. That is probably where the problem exists.

It is a Department of the Army area, and the commanding general is directly under the Army, the High Commissioner. And yet the great political problem is the fact that there are 900,000 Japanese speaking people who regard themselves as Japanese, and therefore this is a built-in major problem between us and Japan.

So the Japanese and we have a very special relationship over the Ryukyu Islands. But we have a rather curious three-cornered situation as a result, because the High Commissioner has his channel back to Army and not, of course, to State.

Senator Pell. What is the general view in Japan with regard to the development of the natural normal trading relationship between the industrial area of Japan and the agrarian area of China?

Ambassador Reischauer. Japan has an emotional feeling about, "Here is this great mass of people next door, and it is only natural to have them as customers of ours," and so on.

The general public has leaned in that direction, and there is a great tendency and desire for not only trade relations but diplomatic relations. This is a great embarrassment to the Government there, because they try to cooperate with us in the general free world stand. They have therefore taken what they call a forward-looking attitude towards trade with China.

Actually, the people who know much about it do not expect any great trade to develop, because the Chinese have not developed an economy that can trade with Japan very much. They could absorb endless Japanese things, but they do not have anything to pay with, either in the way of foreign exchange or goods.

I think the Japanese Government feels that the best way to educate the Japanese public on this situation -- that there is not very much in China trade -- is to give enough rope, so that they can find out through experience.

Senator Pell. Who do the Japanese people consider their natural enemy?

Ambassador Reischauer. Russia. This is normal, sort of emotionally built into them. They have felt that way about the Russians for a long time.

Senator Pell. Like we used to consider the British Empire in our first century?

Ambassador Reischauer. Even a more hostile feeling.

Senator Pell. But they are more hostile to the Soviets than to the Chinese?

Ambassador Reischauer. Yes, it is a traditional thing that actually goes back about 150 years, this attitude toward Russia. And the end of the war experience was a very unpleasant one, where the Russians came in just to take advantage of our victory.

Senator Pell. But the feeling toward the Chinese is one of -- What?

Ambassador Reischauer. Well, it is a very complicated one. I used to say there is a guilt complex in it. China is their Greece and Rome, you know, source of ancient civilization, and they have a sort of sentimental feeling about it.

On top of that, they have a sort of guilt complex about having ruined China in modern years. Unquestionably there is a certain race element involved. The Chinese seem more like natural people and they share a lot culturally with them. They have a strong emotional bias in their favor. At the same time, they have underneath it all a sort of contempt.

Senator Pell. And what is the view with regard to Formosa China with its 10 million people and Mainland China with its 750 million people?

Ambassador Reischauer. For a long time the Japanese disregarded the Formosans completely. More recently, they have developed a much more healthy awareness of Formosa, and the fact is that their trade with Formosa has tended to be larger than their trade with the continent.

And now they are developing a real pride in the fact that their great advance is largely a result of Japan's investment in Formosa in the colonial period, and they have a pride in that the Formosan population is very definitely pro-Japanese, one of the few colonial populations that have come out with a nostalgic love for their former rulers.

Senator Pell. I remember going to Columbia University -- we had a course for Naval officers, and we used Formosa as our case study for military government. We were taught while they did not like the Japanese too much, they accepted them. If there were any people they disliked more, it was the Mainland Chinese. This was Navy doctrine in 1944.

Ambassador Reischauer. A lot of this has been a sort of subtle way of showing disapproval of the existing governments. I do not think they love the Japanese that much.

Senator Pell. One final question is in connection with the proposed Foreign Service Academy. I was wondering if you had any views one way or the other.

Ambassador Reischauer. I just cannot see any point to it, myself, because I do not think it is that technical a subject that should be boiled down and cut off from the rest of the thing.

In fact, I thought the whole effort of the Foreign Service was to draw people into it with as broad experience as possible. A few years ago, it was standard policy to not encourage persons to come directly out of college into the Foreign Service. They wanted people to have a broader experience than that.

Senator Pell. They wanted the boys from the East to go West, and the boys from the West to go East?

Ambassador Reischauer. And some other kinds of contacts, more than just the academic one, before you went into Foreign Service work.

I think that is all very sound. Certainly you do not want the academic experience of a specialized kind of academy that cuts them off from the rest.

I just cannot see it in those terms, unless it means an in-service training for people after they have gone in.

Senator Pell. Have you any views as to the consensus of people within the career service with regard to the Foreign Service Academy?

Ambassador Reischauer. I can give you a guess as to this from my personal friends. I think it would be disapproving.

Senator Pell. I would agree with you.

Senator Jackson. For clarification, when we talk about the academy, the initial proposal was for an undergraduate academy, and now there is the proposal for a graduate academy.

Senator Pell. Yes. I am talking about the graduate academy.

Ambassador Reischauer. I would have a rather negative view toward this concept.

Senator Jackson. The truth of the matter is that this type of post-graduate work is available in our existing institutions of higher learning, or can be initiated there, and then you have the opportunity of going to the various centers throughout the country.

Ambassador Reischauer. If I had the problem of training people for it, I would want to get them scattered widely and then bring them into the Foreign Service.

Senator Pell. I think one thing that would be really beneficial to them after spending 15 years in the Foreign Service would be to get them sent out to St. Louis.

Ambassador Reischauer. I think it would be very good to give them sabbatical leave from the Foreign Service in something of this sort, but not in a Foreign Service Academy.

Senator Jackson. I think Mr. Engberg had a question or two.

Professor Engberg. I have been interested over quite a period of time in this matter of personality in the ambassador's office and this matter of legal control. There is a sort of contrasting type of thing, here.

We run into situations such as the Ambassador talks about in Japan, where they have the same legal situations as in other embassies so far as responsibility to State and to Washington, and then we run into other areas where some of our other testimony has indicated that things have not worked nearly as smoothly.

So I have a couple of questions I would like to have you consider. I am not at all sure that they are really within your area of knowledge.



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Do the different agencies here in Washington, when they send out people, throughout all this great listing of folks that you have on your country team -- do they make any attempt to deliberately select individuals who are not only trained as persons but trained technically to fit that particular country?

Ambassador Reischauer. Some of them do, very definitely.

We had a new attache recently who came in very well prepared, I thought, who had been working on these problems back in Treasury here, and was well grounded in what he was going to run into in Tokyo.

Professor Engberg. Is he well grounded in the area of his work so far as Japan is concerned?

Ambassador Reischauer. Yes. That is what I mean. He is quite familiar with these things. I would not say this is true in all cases, but I think quite a few of the people who have come are very well grounded.

Professor Engberg. Another question along that same line: So many of these agencies that are set up by statutory authority send out people that you work with in your country team. Then you take over your position and, to use the terms of the President, you are supposed to be in complete "coordination and supervision" of that program.

And I think Mr. Herter at one time used the term "vehicle of decision." I took that directly from an article that Mr. Herter wrote.

Your control over your country team, then, is much more of personal relations than it is of legal control?

Ambassador Reischauer. This is not really a country team, what we have here. This is all built in as some things attached to the embassy. So I think we have a considerable amount of even legal control, because these things have to go out through the embassy channels of communication.

Senator Jackson. You operate under President Kennedy's letter, too.

Professor Engberg. The point I was getting at, Senator Jackson, is that the Congress has established a lot of these areas. Some of these areas are really not directly under the President. They become the Ambassador's domain when they end up in Japan.

Senator Jackson. I think the real problem here is that while these people - like a Treasury attache - are attached to the embassy, you do not have the control over their efficiency reports, their promotions, and so on. Therefore you confront the very human problem: where does the particular employee look? Does he look to our ambassador? Does he look to his superior in the States?

Is this not part of the problem?

I assume, on the other hand, that if a given employee or representative of Treasury or Commerce or any of the other departments fails to measure up, a letter from the ambassador indicating that he just has not conducted himself properly over here, has not done a real good job, is not going to help him within his own department.

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But there are problems where the agencies' own ideas on a given policy conflict with those of the State Department, so the tendency of the employee or representative, I would think, would be to follow the lead of his own department or agency.

In that particular situation this makes your problem a difficult one in exercising proper managerial control.

Ambassador Reischauer. Yes. I see the problem in theory. But I can only say in theory, because I cannot remember any example of anything like that. You are assuming that one of these boxes represents a group in Washington that now has a very different policy.

Senator Jackson. I think what it gets down to is that Ambassador Reischauer's leadership has been such, and his attitude toward his people has been such, that the ordinary or normal technical and legal problems that might appear have not appeared because of the way he has handled things.

Professor Engberg. That is exactly the point, Senator Jackson.

Ambassador Reischauer. I have never felt any distinction between the people that belong in these boxes and the people that belong in our own boxes here.

Senator Jackson. That is perhaps just the reason why it works.

Professor Engberg. We have been talking about staffing, and here is an almost perfect example of what we would have State set up in areas in terms of personality and control and getting results.

And when you start looking at the boxes and the legal type of thing, you say, "Well, the ambassador doesn't have any real control over this, but it works because of the type of staffing that has been done."

That is the point I was interested in bringing out.

Senator Jackson. I think it is a very good point.

Ambassador Reischauer. Of course, we could have a much more serious problem with the United States Forces in Japan, where there is no even theoretical subordination there. If we had a real divergence of opinion there, I think we would be in real trouble.

We have avoided any feuds, and we have fortunately seen things the same way. In getting a new man, if it turns out he has very divergent views from myself, then I think we would have a real problem of coordination there, at which point I think the only possible solution is a reference back to Washington, and Washington would have to decide to change one or the other in that case.

Senator Jackson. Yes.

Incidentally, is there any interchange on appointments of that importance, which involve not just the ordinary military command requirement? Are there consultations with State in this respect?

Ambassador Reischauer. Not that I am aware of in this regard. I just hear of the fact that General Preston has taken General Smart's place.

Senator Jackson. As you may know, under the stimulus of hearings before the predecessor to this Subcommittee, a State-Defense exchange program was started. We encouraged this several years ago -- a program between State and Defense, wherein officers from DOD go over to work in State, and vice versa. And we have tried to impress upon both departments the importance of this and other coordinating efforts.

I just wondered: In a case like this, it seems to me that the primary job of an officer going out there is to have a full comprehension of diplomatic and political problems.

Ambassador Reischauer. They have tried to cooperate in the following way. I think they have chosen the man without consultation with us, but General LeMay was out when this was announced, and I said to him, "Can't you get your new man here in plenty of time for this overlap with General Smart?"

Senator Jackson. Is this an Air Force job?

Ambassador Reischauer. It is an Air Force job, because the chief job there is Air Force. The commander of the Fifth Force is concurrently commander of the United States Forces in Japan.

Senator Jackson. They have a large Naval establishment?

Ambassador Reischauer. It is, but it has somehow been made an Air Force thing.

I said to LeMay, "Can't we have a big overlap there?" And he said, "Yes, we will see General Preston comes out there," because I wanted him to observe Smart and the attitudes he has taken and the contacts he has made. I thought it would be very helpful to him to get the thing off in the right way.

Senator Jackson. We might close on this question: In your fine book, Wanted: An Asian Policy, you state: "Why surrender the offensive to communism? The defensive can never win in Asia; only the offensive can, and, by all that we believe in, it rightly belongs to us."

Do you think that we are making any progress in this direction?

Ambassador Reischauer. I think we could be more on the offensive than we are in many places. I certainly have tried to take the offensive in Japan.

I spend most of my time -- it is a strange attack I am making, but I am making an attack on classical Marxism. That is our real enemy there. And I never miss an opportunity to take a dig at it, although the word is never mentioned.

But it is, "Let's talk of a new view of history."

The whole thing is, "You know, these are the guys that are really out of date, and we are the wave of the future," and this kind of thing.

So I am continually on the offensive, and they recognize it as such. They always refer to it as the "Kennedy-Reischauer offensive." I am very flattered to be hyphenated there.

Professor Tufts. What about in Asia generally?

Ambassador Reischauer. Well, I still think in many places we too much give ourselves the image of defense rather than the offense in the sense of establishing prosperity, freedom for people, and eventually democracy, rather than just sitting back and trying to hold off the other people, who are on the offensive.

It is more a frame of mind for yourself, often, but I think the whole country sometimes has this difficulty.

When you look at America from abroad, you keep wondering why Americans are so worried and pessimistic. Ask any Japanese what has happened in the last few years, and they will say, "We are making terrific progress as opposed to the other side."

Senator Pell. Along the lines of that same thought, I was wondering what the Ambassador's reaction is to the term "counter-insurgency," which to me is an unfortunate term, because our nation was born in insurgency, and we encourage insurgency of the right kind.


Ambassador Reischauer. I have not thought in terms of that particular thing, but that is a good example of the way we approach this problem.

Senator Jackson. On behalf of the committee, Mr. Ambassador, I certainly want to express to you our appreciation for your fine statement, and the helpful counsel and advice you have given us. We are very grateful.

Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 10:30 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.)

July 1, 1963



NOTE:  
Dotted lines indicate subordination for purposes of coordination within the Embassy of agencies representing branches of the United States Government other than the Department of State.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART - AMERICAN EMBASSY AND AFFILIATED AGENCIES, TOKYO, JAPAN

July 1, 1963

